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NOTE
A CHOICE IN CRIMINAL LAW: VICTIMS,
DEFENDANTS, AND THE OPTION
OF RESTITUTION
Kelse Moen*
The American prison system has expanded beyond all reasonable
bounds.  Presently, the United States holds the highest per capita prison
population of any country in the world, while historically poor and
marginalized communities make up a wildly disproportionate percentage
of its prison population.  It is in that light that this Note attempts to find
an alternative to the current system of mass incarceration.  It does so by
seeking to revive the nearly forgotten tradition of criminal restitution,
which holds that the purpose of the criminal law is to compensate victims
for their loss, rather than to punish criminals.  This Note argues that
restitution would benefit both the victim and the criminal, by repairing as
much of the victim’s harm as possible while also allowing the criminal to
avoid the harsh and socially stigmatic prison system.  The Note begins
with a theoretical defense of restitution, and answers common objections
to it.  It then turns to the practical question of transitioning from the
current system.  Building off of recent advances in restorative justice and
in private arbitration and mediation, it argues in favor of adding an
“opt-out” provision to criminal procedure codes, wherein the victim and
the defendant in any criminal case could decide, by mutual agreement, to
remove their case from the criminal courts and into whatever alternative
dispute resolution mechanism—public or private—that they prefer.
Hopefully, an opt-out system would educate the population about the
restitutionary alternative to contemporary criminal law and spark a shift
to restitution that is driven, not by ivory-tower theorizing, but by the free
choices of real victims and defendants.
* J.D. Candidate, Cornell Law School, 2013; B.A., summa cum laude, Emory Univer-
sity, 2009.  The idea for this Note first came about when I took the class “The American Prison
State” through the Ludwig von Mises Institute’s online Mises Academy.  My deep thanks go
out to class instructor Dr. Daniel D’Amico, of Loyola University in New Orleans, and to the
staff at the Mises Academy for sparking my interest in the prison system and alternatives to it.
I would also like to thank Stephen Garvey, who graciously provided helpful feedback at each
step of the writing process, despite his disagreements with my thesis.  Most importantly, thank
you to my parents, Michael and Susan Moen, and to Allison Cloran, for their love and support
throughout the process.
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INTRODUCTION
The American prison system has expanded beyond all reasonable
bounds.  Presently, the United States holds the highest per capita sen-
tenced prison population of any country in the world, with almost a quar-
ter of the world’s prisoners.1  Nearly 2.3 million people were
incarcerated in American prisons in 2010, the most recent year for which
the Department of Justice compiled statistics.2  If one considers unin-
carcerated people subject to the correctional system through probation or
parole, approximately 7.1 million—or one in thirty-three3—adults are
1 ROY WALMSLEY, WORLD PRISON POPULATION LIST 1 *9th ed. 2011), available at
http://www.idcr.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/WPPL-9-22.pdf; see also Adam Liptak,
U.S. Prison Population Dwarfs Other Nations, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 23, 2008), http://www.ny
times.com/2008/04/23/world/americas/23iht-23prison.12253738.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=incar-
ceration%20nation&st=cse.  When one includes non-sentenced detainees under the term “pris-
oners,” China holds slightly more total prisoners than does the United States, but many fewer
per capita. WALMSLEY, supra.
2 Lauren E. Glaze, Correctional Populations in the United States, 2010, BUREAU JUST.
STAT. (U.S. Dep’t of Just., D.C.), Dec. 2011, at 3, available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/
pub/pdf/cpus10.pdf.
3 Id. at 2.
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under correctional supervision.4  In addition, there are 81,000 youths,5
for a grand total of one in fifty Americans of all ages subject to the
correctional system.6
But the burden of such mass incarceration is borne disproportion-
ately by poor, inner-city black communities.7  In 2010, black people con-
stituted 13.6% of the U.S. population,8 but approximately 38% of the
total prison population.9  Mass incarceration of poor blacks also appears
to exacerbate problems like the breakdown of traditional marriage and
the two-parent family,10 feelings of alienation,11 and cyclical poverty en-
demic to the inner city.12
Recently, the United States Supreme Court explicitly recognized the
danger and violence ubiquitous in contemporary mass incarceration.  In
Brown v. Plata, the Court held that California’s severe prison overcrowd-
ing constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments.13  Overcrowding promoted the spread of
4 Id. at 3.
5 Sarah Hockenberry et al., Juvenile Residential Facility Census, 2008: Selected Find-
ings, OFFICE JUVENILE JUST. & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION (U.S. Dep’t of Just., D.C.), July
2011, at 2, available at  https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/231683.pdf.
6 The total U.S. population is approximately 315 million. U.S. and World Population
Clocks, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/main/www/popclock.html (last visited
Dec. 18, 2012).  However, calculations of the percentage of Americans in prison are somewhat
inexact because a few hundred thousand of the total number of “American” prison inmates
appear to be “aliens” or illegal immigrants. UNITED STATES GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
CRIMINAL ALIEN STATISTICS: INFORMATION ON INCARCERATIONS, ARRESTS, AND COSTS 10 &
fig. 3 (2011), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11187.pdf.
7 See David Garland, Introduction, in MASS IMPRISONMENT: SOCIAL CAUSES AND CON-
SEQUENCES 1, 1–2 (David Garland ed., 2001); GLENN C. LOURY, RACE, INCARCERATION, AND
AMERICAN VALUES 22–23 (2008); Peter Wagner, Incarceration Is Not an Equal Opportunity
Punishment, PRISON POLICY INITIATIVE, http://www.prisonpolicy.org/articles/notequal.html
(last updated August 28, 2012).  Loı¨c Wacquant stresses that mass imprisonment does not
affect the black community per se; rather, its onus falls almost entirely on poor, inner-city
blacks.  Loı¨c Wacquant, Forum, in RACE, INCARCERATION, AND AMERICAN VALUES 57, 59
(2008) (“[T]he expansion and intensification of the activities of the police, courts, and prisons
over the past quarter-century have been finely targeted by class, ethnicity, and place, leading to
. . . hyper-incarceration of one particular category: lower-class black men in the crumbling
ghetto.  The rest of society—including middle-class blacks—is practically untouched.”).
8 See KAREN R. HUMES et al., OVERVIEW OF RACE AND HISPANIC ORIGIN: 2010, at 7
(2010), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-02.pdf.
9 Paul Guerino et al., Prisoners in 2010, BUREAU JUST. STAT. (U.S. Dep’t of Just.,
D.C.), Dec. 2011, at 26 tbl.13, available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/p10.pdf.
10 See Kerwin Kofi Charles & Ming Ching Luoh, Male Incarceration, the Marriage
Market, and Female Outcomes, 92 REV. ECON. & STAT. 614, 614–15 (2010).
11 See Wacquant, supra note 7, at 61–65.
12 See LOURY, supra note 7, at 20–21.
13 Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1922–23 (2011).  For a sympathetic history and
discussion of American prison-condition litigation, see Margo Schlanger, Civil Rights Injunc-
tions Over Time: A Case Study of Jail and Prison Court Orders, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 550
(2006).
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disease14 and imposed months-long, or even year-long, delays on receipt
of vital medical services.15  When finally provided, medical services
were woefully substandard; approximately one inmate could be expected
to die each week as a result of poor medical care.16  Overcrowding also
made it extremely difficult for prison officials to keep order; the Court
recounted one instance where guards did not even discover the body of a
prisoner killed in a crowded gymnasium until hours after his murder.17
Perhaps it is no surprise that, coming out of such an environment, prison
inmates come to form “a permanent nether caste.”18  Indeed, even when
prisoners finally escape from the system, all they can expect to find are
diminished job prospects, social stigma, and a lessened likelihood of ever
escaping poverty.19
This discussion on mass incarceration could fill up entire volumes
unto itself.  I only touch upon it here, perfunctorily, in order to show the
level of dysfunction in the American prison system, and to suggest that
alternatives to it are desperately needed.  Indeed, such dysfunction has
already sparked a robust and radical literature exploring possible alterna-
tives to the prison system.20  I hope that this Note will be a new contribu-
tion to that literature.
But while the other literature focuses on the prison system itself,
this Note focuses more on the philosophical issues.  I will argue that the
broader problems of the criminal justice system stem from a fundamental
philosophical error in criminal law: the criminal law’s insistence that
crimes are wrongs done against some abstract collectivity—”the people”
14 See Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1933 n.7.
15 See id. at 1924–26.
16 Id. at 1927.
17 See id. at 1933–34.
18 See LOURY, supra note 7, at 21.
19 See id. at 20–21.
20 See, e.g., JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND RESPONSIVE REGULATION
10–12 (2002) (presenting “restorative justice” as a system for resolving conflicts between indi-
viduals outside of government courts); ANGELA Y. DAVIS, ARE PRISONS OBSOLETE? 105–15
(2003) (recommending abolition of the prison system, to be replaced by social welfare pro-
grams and a focus on repairing the ties between victims and offenders); PETER MOSKOS, IN
DEFENSE OF FLOGGING 1–6 (2011) (suggesting that most people would prefer to be flogged
than spend several years in prison and that, as a way of scaling back incarceration, convicted
criminals should be allowed to choose between the two).  Some courts have fashioned their
own unique punishments as a partial alternative to prison time. See, e.g., United States v.
Gementera, 379 F.3d 596, 598 (9th Cir. 2004) (requiring defendant, as a shaming method, to
wear a sign reading, “I stole mail.  This is my punishment,” in front of a local post office); Dan
M. Kahan, Punishment Incommensurability, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 691, 697–706 (1998) (dis-
cussing the advantages and disadvantages of fines, community service, and shaming penalties
as opposed to prison sentences); Jan Hoffman, Crime and Punishment: Shame Gains Popular-
ity, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 16, 1997), http://www.nytimes.com/1997/01/16/us/crime-and-punish-
ment-shame-gains-popularity.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm (recounting courts’ orders that an
assaulter place warning signs on his property, a thief allow victims to steal from his own home,
and a man who harassed his ex-wife allow her to spit in his face).
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or “the state”—rather than private wrongs, done to an identifiable victim,
which can be remedied through victim compensation.21
As an alternative to the current system, I will defend the theory of
criminal “restitution.”  Restitution holds that crimes should be treated the
same as torts.  That is, it holds that the purpose of the criminal law
should be to force the criminal to pay compensation directly to the vic-
tim, in order to undo as much of the victim’s damage as possible.22  But,
in holding victim compensation as paramount, restitution would also
benefit the masses of people now in prison.  For example, by requiring
repayment or return of stolen goods instead of prison time, restitution
allows the offender to pay and then get on with life, free of the crippling
social effects of a prison sentence.  Adopting restitution would thereby
reduce the prison’s scope in society and lead to a proportionate diminish-
ment of its ill effects.
Nevertheless, criminal restitution is a marginal and little-appreciated
theory.  Whatever its theoretical benefits, little thought has been paid to
practical questions of implementation.  Such neglect has certainly not
helped its popularity.  My Note seeks to fill that gap.  I will argue in
favor of adding an “opt-out” provision to criminal procedure codes,
wherein the victim and offender could agree to opt out of the govern-
ment’s justice system and settle their case like a tort, through whatever
alternative dispute resolution mechanism—public or private—they
choose.  As I will discuss below, my proposal has certain pitfalls and
cannot realize all the benefits of a pure restitutionary legal system.  But, I
believe that it can constitute an important step in transitioning away from
the misguided philosophies that undergird the contemporary criminal jus-
tice system, and that it can do so in a way that is motivated by the real
concerns of actual victims and defendants, rather than of academics.
Before we can discuss an opt-out proposal, it is necessary to discuss
the theories of crime and punishment that influence that proposal.  Parts I
and II will discuss what I believe are the two philosophical poles of crim-
inal thought.  Part I discusses the mainstream theory, that crimes are
21 For an account of the displacement of the victim in American criminal law, see Wil-
liam F. McDonald, The Role of the Victim in America, in ASSESSING THE CRIMINAL: RESTITU-
TION, RETRIBUTION, AND THE LEGAL PROCESS 295 (Randy E. Barnett and John Hagel III eds.,
1977).
22 Due to the constraints of this Note, I will not present a rigorous theoretical defense of
restitution.  For such a defense, see, for example, MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, THE ETHICS OF
LIBERTY 51–61, 77–95 (1982) [hereinafter ROTHBARD, ETHICS OF LIBERTY]; Randy Barnett,
Restitution: A New Paradigm of Criminal Justice, 87 ETHICS 279 (1977) [hereinafter Barnett,
Restitution]; N. Stephan Kinsella, Punishment and Proportionality: The Estoppel Approach,
12 J. LIBERTARIAN STUD. 51 (1996); see also BRUCE BENSON, THE ENTERPRISE OF LAW: JUS-
TICE WITHOUT THE STATE 11–83 (1990) (comparing private, restitution-oriented legal systems
favorably to government-run, public-wrong-oriented legal systems, from an economic and his-
torical perspective).
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“public wrongs.”  Part II introduces the competing theory of criminal
restitution.  This part differs in focus from the foundational restitutionary
works by Randy Barnett, Murray Rothbard, and others.  Most of the
foundational works were written in the 1970s or 1980s, when the prison
system was merely a fraction of its present size; concomitantly, they ei-
ther did not or could not foresee the system of mass incarceration that we
live under today.23  My discussion, particularly Part II.B., is written in
the context of mass incarceration, and therefore, unlike the foundational
works, it considers the question of how restitution can rein in the prison
system for the benefit of defendants to be just as important as the ques-
tion of how to compensate previously neglected victims.  Part III presents
my opt-out proposal and discusses what an opt-out criminal system
might look like.
I. CRIMES AS “PUBLIC WRONGS”
The prevailing approach to criminal law holds that crimes are “pub-
lic wrongs,”24 which are to be answered by punishing the wrongdoer,
rather than by compensating the victim.25  In Henry M. Hart’s enduring
formulation, crimes are those acts which “incur a formal and solemn pro-
nouncement of the moral condemnation of the community.”26  As such,
when a crime occurs it is construed, for legal purposes, as a wrong done
to the community at large, rather than to any specific victim—hence the
designation of criminal cases in terms such as “The People [or the State]
v. Smith.”27  Moreover, if a criminal is found guilty, it is the commu-
nity’s interests that the law purports to vindicate.28  As punishment for
invoking the community’s moral condemnation, the criminal will be sent
to a taxpayer-funded prison, where he or she will be locked away for a
number of years, based on what the community deems appropriate.  The
23 For instance, in 1977, Randy Barnett believed that society was “witnessing the death
throes” of a punishment- and prison-based criminal law, which he believed to be unworkable.
Barnett, Restitution, supra note 22, at 280.  Since then, contrary to Barnett’s optimistic predic-
tions, the prison system has quintupled in size. See Key Facts at a Glance: Correctional
Populations, BUREAU JUST. STAT., http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/glance/tables/corr2tab.cfm
(last visited Dec. 18, 2012).
24 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Crime and Tort: Old Wine in Old Bottles, in ASSESSING
THE CRIMINAL: RESTITUTION, RETRIBUTION, AND THE LEGAL PROCESS 231, 233 (Randy E.
Barnett & John Hagel III eds., 1977) (defining the prevailing approach to crime).
25 See, e.g., OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 24 (Barnes & Noble
Library of Essential Reading 2004) (1881) (delineating the offenses for which the law seeks
criminal punishment rather than victim compensation).
26 Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401,
405 (1958).
27 Cf. 1 CRIM. PROC. § 1.5(k) (2011) (discussing the criminal law’s subordination of the
victim’s interests to those of the state).
28 See, e.g., Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 52 (1986) (“The criminal justice system is
not operated primarily for the benefit of victims, but for the benefit of society as a whole.”).
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victim, meanwhile, may be overjoyed to see the criminal sent to prison
and may find satisfaction in the idea that justice has been done.  Never-
theless, the criminal law is not designed for the victim’s benefit.29  Under
the current system, the victim’s interests rank far below the community’s
interest in morally condemning the criminal.  The victim rarely receives
restitution for his or her loss and, when restitution actually occurs, it is
typically given only at the discretion of the state’s court.30
Today, the major debates over criminal law take the “crimes as pub-
lic wrongs” formulation as a given.  Indeed, textbooks31 often explain
criminal and penal theory as a debate between the familiar theories of
retributivism32 and utilitarianism.33  But while, superficially, these theo-
ries might seem very different, they are better understood as simply be-
ing two variations on the broader public-wrong conception of criminal
law.  Indeed, we can see how each of the dominant theories treats the
“crimes as public wrongs” formulation as a given in the way they argue
29 See McDonald, supra note 21, at 295–96 (“The damage to the individual victim is
incidental and its redress is no longer regarded as a function of the criminal justice process.
The victim is told that if he wants to recover his losses he should hire a lawyer and sue in civil
court.  The criminal justice system is not for his benefit, but for the community’s.  Its purposes
are to deter crime, rehabilitate criminals, punish criminals, and do justice, but not to restore
victims to their wholeness or to vindicate them.”).
30 For a discussion of contemporary victim-restitution laws, see infra note 38.
31 For a representative example, see JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CRIMINAL LAW 31–48 (5th ed. 2009). See also CHARLES F. ABEL & FRANK H. MARSH, PUN-
ISHMENT AND RESTITUTION 3 (1984) (“There is a remarkable consensus . . . that the problem of
crime and the criminal is actually a problem of continually shifting the emphasis our criminal
institutions place upon rehabilitation, deterrence, and retribution.”).
32 See, e.g., C.S. LEWIS, THE PROBLEM OF PAIN 83 (1940) (arguing that retributive pun-
ishment “plants the flag of truth within the fortress of a rebel soul”—that is, it punishes the
criminal for violating the moral code); MICHAEL S. MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A THEORY OF
CRIMINAL LAW 104 (1997) (calling a criminal’s moral culpability a sufficient condition for
being punished); John Hospers, Retribution: The Ethics of Punishment, in ASSESSING THE
CRIMINAL: RESTITUTION, RETRIBUTION, AND THE LEGAL PROCESS 181, 184, 206–08  (Randy E.
Barnett and John Hagel III eds., 1977) (judging the duty to punish by considering the crimi-
nal’s moral desert).
33 See, e.g., Jeremy Bentham, General Principles: Of the Ends of Punishment, in THE
RATIONALE OF PUNISHMENT, available at http://www.laits.utexas.edu/poltheory/bentham/rp/
rp.b01.c03.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2012) (arguing that punishment is only worthwhile if it
serves some greater good); CESARE BECCARIA, On Crimes and Punishment, in ON CRIMES AND
PUNISHMENTS AND OTHER WRITINGS 5, 7, 10–12 (Aaron Thomas ed., Aaron Thomas & Jer-
emy Parzen trans., 2008) (describing criminal justice as arising from social necessity and to be
judged by its usefulness or harmfulness).  It is important to distinguish utilitarianism as a
criminal theory from utilitarianism as a broader philosophy that holds that the good is that
which maximizes happiness and minimizes pain.  For the latter, see JEREMY BENTHAM, AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 1–7 (Dover Publication
2007) (1789); JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM 7 (George Sher ed., 2d ed. 2001) (1861).
My entire Note is a work of philosophical utilitarianism: it argues that restitution is the best
theory of crime, because adopting it would lead to beneficial outcomes.  However, I reject
utilitarianism as a criminal theory, which uses criminal punishment as a means to achieve
some broader social good.
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over criminal-law controversies.  Debates over the death penalty, for in-
stance, tend to focus on how much the death penalty deters crime or
whether it gives criminals their “just deserts”—two criteria which would
be meaningless if the victim’s interest in compensation were paramount.
The question of whether the death penalty remedies any of the victim’s
harm is pushed to the periphery; while some observers may hope that the
death penalty brings victims “closure,” its main justification is to punish
or incapacitate the criminal.  Of course, we see the same criminal-cen-
tered arguments whatever the topic, be it three-strikes laws, felon voting
rights, or sex offender registries, all of which are typically justified from
a retributivist or utilitarian—but not restitutionary—perspective.
The public-wrong conception of crime also explains the criminal
law’s focus on the defendant’s mental state, a focus which neither re-
tributivism nor utilitarianism seriously disputes.  In contrast to tort law,
which does not ask whether a tortfeasor had a “culpable mind,” criminal
law treats mental state as an essential component of most criminal con-
victions.34  But this only makes sense when we recognize that the domi-
nant criminological philosophy construes crimes simply as acts that bring
about the moral condemnation of the community, meaning that criminal
law only really cares about moral “badness.”  Conversely, if we were to
treat crimes as private wrongs against a victim, then mental culpability
would become irrelevant and all that would matter would be to tally the
amount of harm actually caused.
II. RESTITUTION
A. Theory
Tallying the amount of harm actually caused is exactly what restitu-
tion seeks to do.  It holds that the goal of criminal law should be to force
the criminal to compensate the victim for whatever harms the criminal
caused, and to bring the victim as close as possible to the position that
the victim was in before the crime occurred.  Restitution essentially holds
that crimes should be treated the same as torts; under a pure restitution-
ary system there would not be different laws concerning “private” and
“public” wrongs.35
34 21 AM. JUR. CRIM. LAW § 121 (2d ed. 2008).
35 See Barnett, Restitution, supra note 22, at 287–89.  For this reason, it may be some-
what misleading to discuss restitution as a theory of “crime” at all, because “crime” implies
punishment, not just repayment.  Restitution, on the other hand, only requires that the person
who committed the wrong pay damages.  For a discussion of the distinction between the crimi-
nal law’s “punishment” and restitution’s “legal reparations,” see Geoffrey Sayre-McCord,
Criminal Justice and Legal Reparations as an Alternative to Punishment, 11 PHIL. ISSUES 502,
503–04 (2001). But see ABEL & MARSH, supra note 31, at 23–49 (arguing that restitution fits
the criteria of “criminal punishment” in that it involves unpleasant consequences visited upon
a lawbreaker because he broke the law, and those punishments are administered and regulated
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Like tort law or contract law, restitution separates society’s broad
interest in preventing and responding to wrongdoing from what goes on
inside the actual courtroom.  Therefore, restitution emphatically rejects
the idea that, just because “society” has an interest in reducing crime,
crimes should be considered wrongs against “society.”  After all, society
has an interest in reducing torts and contract breaches too.  But when
such breaches occur, only a specific aggrieved victim has standing to
bring a claim, and it is the individual victim’s prosecution of the case,
rather than its public prosecution, that is supposed to deter future wrong-
doing.36  Just because society gains external benefits from effective tort
litigation does not mean that it needs to be one of the litigants.
In other words, restitution is only a subset of the law of remedies.
But it is one that seeks to remedy crimes with damage awards to victims
rather than with punishment to criminals.  It is not a replacement for
police work or social work that serves crime prevention goals, but is
instead a way of rectifying crimes that were not in fact prevented.37
What would a restitutionary system look like?  Simply put, under a
restitutionary system, if, for example, someone steals my car, the entity
to challenge the criminal in court is not “the People of the State of New
York.”  Rather, it is the person harmed by the criminal’s act: the victim,
me.  I would bring a suit to either have my car returned in the same
condition it was in before the theft occurred or, if the thief has already
disposed of the car, to be paid back its full value, plus extra compensa-
tion for the inconvenience of temporarily losing my car, and for any
emotional distress or other consequential damages that the crime might
have provoked.  Unlike the prosecutors who today claim to work on my
behalf, I would be unlikely to bring suit solely to punish unjust behavior.
Rather, I would bring suit—if I decided to bring it at all—for the primary
means of getting my just compensation.  Such a conceptualization of
criminal law stands in stark contrast to the present system, which the
political philosopher Murray Rothbard ably encapsulated:
What happens nowadays is the following absurdity: A
steals $15,000 from B.  The government tracks down,
tries, and convicts A, all at the expense of B, as one of
the numerous taxpayers. . . .  Then, the government, in-
stead of forcing A to repay B or to work at forced labor
by the state).  Without taking sides in this terminological debate, I will only refer to restitution
as a theory of crime in this Note for the sake of simplicity.
36 For a discussion of the deterrent effect of civil law remedies, see infra note 67 and
accompanying text.
37 Cf. Giorgio Del Vecchio, The Problem of Penal Justice, 27 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 65, 78
(1958) (arguing that crimes cannot be controlled by the exclusive use of legal sanctions but
require moral and social efforts as well).
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until the debt is paid, forces B, the victim, to pay taxes to
support the criminal in prison for ten or twenty years’
time.  Where in the world is the justice here?  The victim
not only loses his money, but pays more money besides
for the dubious thrill of catching, convicting, and then
supporting the criminal; and the criminal is still en-
slaved, but not for the good purpose of recompensing his
victim.38
If, rather than being the victim of a car theft, I were the victim of a
crime like murder—the damage from which cannot be tallied as easily as
property crimes—then my heirs could seek damages based on my ex-
pected remaining lifetime earnings, as is done in wrongful-death tort
suits.39
38 Murray N. Rothbard, Punishment and Proportionality, in ASSESSING THE CRIMINAL:
RESTITUTION, RETRIBUTION, AND THE LEGAL PROCESS 259, 261 (Randy E. Barnett & John
Hegel III eds. 1977) [hereinafter Rothbard, Proportionality and Punishment].  Since Roth-
bard’s writing, many states and the federal government have enacted “victim restitution” laws.
See, e.g., Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. § 3663A (2006); CAL. PENAL
CODE § 1202.4(a) (West 2004); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.089 (West 2010); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 17-14-3 (2008); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-2280 (LexisNexis 2009); N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 60.27 (McKinney 2009); 18 PA. STAT. ANN. § 1106 (West 1998); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-
38a-202 (LexisNexis 2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 7043 (2009).  However, these laws
differ from a real restitutionary regime in several ways.  For one, they frequently allow judicial
discretion in deciding whether to order full restitution (i.e. they allow the judge to determine
whether part or all of the loss should go uncompensated), which indicates that the states still
consider restitution as less important than punishment.  The compensable crimes are also typi-
cally limited to physical property crimes or, in the case of violent crimes, to incidental ex-
penses like medical or funeral costs, rather than compensation for the killing itself.  Finally,
when ordered, restitution is typically ordered in addition to prison time.  But, as discussed
below, restitutionary philosophy holds that once compensation has been made, the criminal’s
debt to the victim disappears.  Ordering both prison time and monetary restitution thus unjustly
deprives the criminal twice for a single crime. Cf. Brian Kleinhaus, Note, Serving Two Mas-
ters: Evaluating the Criminal or Civil Nature of the VWPA and MVRA Through the Lens of the
Ex Post Facto Clause, the Abatement Doctrine, and the Sixth Amendment, 73 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2711, 2715–16 (2005) (arguing that federal restitution statutes constitute punishment in
addition to compensation and therefore adding restitution on top of prison time raises various
constitutional issues).
39 Alternatively, courts might employ fixed scales stating the damage required to be paid
for each particular crime.  Rather than calculating the harm of murder in each particular case,
they might say that the cost of murder is always, say, $1 million.  This is not so different from
modern maximum and minimum sentencing laws, which peg the cost of crime to within a
certain range of years in prison.  A famous example of fixed restitution damages is Hammu-
rabi’s Code.  The Code declares, for instance, that, “[i]f a man have no claim on another for
corn and money, and try to demand it by force, he shall pay one-third of a mina of silver in
every case,” Hammurabi’s Code of Laws, § 114, (L.W. King trans.), available at http://
eawc.evansville.edu/anthology/hammurabi.htm (last visited Dec. 20, 2012), while requiring
that someone who knocks out the teeth of a former slave “shall pay one-third of a gold mina.”
Id. at § 201.  Needless to say, I do not support a return to Hammurabi’s Code, which assumes
the legitimacy of slavery, see id. at § 7 (governing the law of buying slaves), and contains
some gruesomely retributive punishments, see, e.g., id. at § 194 (requiring the cutting off of a
negligent nurse’s breasts).  I do not even necessarily believe that fixing the price of crime,
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Alternatively, my heirs could seek psychic, rather than monetary,
compensation.40  For instance, they could theoretically move for the
court to inflict retributive punishment on the offender, which, in modern
society, can only be done through prison time.41  Conversely, if my heirs
valued more rehabilitative methods, they could, for instance, seek a court
order for the offender to undergo counseling or to engage in community
service.  We might expect them to move for psychic compensation if
they believed that receiving money from a dangerous criminal was crass
or socially irresponsible, or if they believed that receiving monetary res-
titution from a given criminal was unlikely.42  A court’s job in such a
case would be to assess the damages that would be received if damages
were actually awarded monetarily, and then award psychic compensation
that equated to roughly the same monetary value.
But there is an important distinction between psychic restitution and
the mainstream theories that it might superficially resemble.  That is,
while psychic restitution could take retributive or rehabilitative forms, it
would only be imposed for the benefit or the satisfaction of the victim or
the victim’s heirs; it remains the repayment of a debt, rather than a state-
ment of social morality, and only differs from other debts in that it gets
repaid in nonmonetary terms.  Moreover, whether the victim or the vic-
tim’s heirs value monetary, retributive, or rehabilitative forms of restitu-
tion is a subjective, personal choice.  None is necessarily better than the
other; each is just another option for victims to seek based on their own
tastes.  Needless to say, crime victims only receive this choice of reme-
dies under restitution, which is tailored to their own satisfaction.
If restitution’s description of criminal law is correct—that the vic-
tim is the one whose rights were violated and who thereby gains a com-
pensable claim against the criminal—then the mainstream focus on the
defendant as the primary subject of the criminal justice system is mis-
whether through a restitutionary code or modern sentencing guidelines, is a good idea—price
fixing, in this context, cannot be trusted to reflect the actual impact of the crime on the victim
or the victim’s heirs.  However, these are arguments for another day.  Hammurabi’s Code
shows us that it is at least possible, in theory, to create a fixed scale of payments under a
restitutionary system.
40 Cf. Randy E. Barnett, Getting Even: Restitution, Preventive Detention, and the Tort/
Crime Distinction, 76 B.U. L. REV. 157, 159 (1996) [hereinafter Barnett, Getting Even] (not-
ing that restitutionary compensation need not be monetary); Rothbard, Punishment and Pro-
portionality, supra note 38, at 263–64 (arguing in favor of psychic compensation for victims
of physical crimes).
41 See MOSKOS, supra note 20, at 23 (noting that, in modern times, the prison is our only
option for inflicting retributive punishment).
42 It is worth noting, however, that under a pure restitutionary system, people might be
incentivized to specify in their living wills what kind of compensation they would like if they
ever become victims of murder, which would limit their heirs’ discretion. See ROTHBARD,
ETHICS OF LIBERTY, supra note 22, at 86.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CJP\22-3\CJP308.txt unknown Seq: 12  2-MAY-13 10:16
744 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 22:733
guided.  Instead, the victim should become the law’s primary focus.  In
Randy Barnett’s words,
This [shift to victims’ rights] represents the complete
overthrow of the paradigm of punishment.  No longer
would the deterrence, reformation, disablement, or reha-
bilitation of the criminal be the guiding principle of the
judicial system. The attainment of these goals would be
incidental to, and as a result of, reparations paid to the
victim.  No longer would the criminal deliberately be
made to suffer for his mistake.  Making good that mis-
take is all that would be required.43
Thus, in sum, through his or her status as the victim of a criminal
invasion, the crime victim, or the victim’s heirs or assignees, gains the
right to restitution from the criminal.  So criminal restitution may best be
considered a strict liability tort.  It holds that the criminal’s subjective
motivations are irrelevant, but that the criminal, as the party that caused
the relevant harm, should be the one who bears the burden of returning
the aggrieved party to the status quo ante.44  Just as in torts, a restitution-
ary system would require the existence of a specific victim who suffered
cognizable harm.  “Society” in and of itself could never have standing to
seek restitution against a criminal, except through something like the
equivalent of a class action made up of many individual victims who
have each suffered harm-in-fact.  Nor could “victims” seek restitution for
crimes like prostitution or drug-dealing, which do not harm any non-
consenting party’s rights.
B. How a Victim-Centric Theory Helps Criminal Defendants
1. Restitution Reestablishes Proportionality
Although the victim would benefit the most from a restitutionary
system, criminal defendants have much to gain as well.  First of all, resti-
tution would place inherent limits on the scope and severity of criminal
punishment, which, as discussed in the introduction to this Note, have
become quite great.  Indeed, restitution appears preferable to the current
system because it reestablishes proportionality between the crime com-
mitted and the sanction imposed by setting an upper limit on the sanction
that can be justifiably imposed.45  For instance, under a restitutionary
43 Barnett, Restitution, supra note 22, at 289 (emphasis added).
44 For a comparison between restitution and strict liability torts, see ABEL & MARSH,
supra note 31, at 35; Barnett, Restitution, supra note 22, at 299.
45 See ROTHBARD, ETHICS OF LIBERTY, supra note 22, at 80; Rothbard, Punishment and
Proportionality, supra note 38, at 263–64.  Rothbard’s brand of restitution is more retributive
than the one defended here and his writings reflect different definitions of certain terms.  Nev-
ertheless, his theory is fundamentally restitutionary.
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system, the criminal who stole my car could only be forced to pay back,
at most, the cost of my car, plus extra amounts for any emotional distress
the crime may have created, and compensation for my car-less time be-
tween theft and repayment.46  Such a system would avoid such tragic
absurdities like those which befell Leandro Andrade, who received two
sentences of twenty-five-years-to-life for stealing $153.54 worth of video
tapes,47 or William Rummel, who received a life sentence for obtaining
$120.75 by “false pretenses.”48  Though the losses that both men caused
could easily have been repaid, under their states’ “three strikes and
you’re out” laws, they both received extremely long sentences that bore
no relation to the harms actually incurred.  The same conclusion holds in
less extreme cases.  What, after all, is the point of forcing a mugger or a
scam artist to spend even a short time in prison when the victim would
likely be happy to accept repayment?
Proportionality is a key part of the restitutionary philosophy.  Un-
like the system that condemned Andrade and Rummel, under a restitutio-
nary system, the victim cannot forcibly extract more than the extent of
his or her damages without becoming an aggressor; once the criminal has
paid enough to make the victim whole, the criminal’s debt has been
erased and the victim has no more right to compensation.49  So, as the
victim of a car theft, one could not try to impose both repayment and
prison time on the criminal.  Neither could one seek to subject the defen-
dant to a life sentence for what amounts to a few-thousand-dollar theft.
Instead, restitution holds that criminals have a right to have their punish-
ment limited to the extent of their crimes.50  This seems to follow from
common sense.  We do not, after all, condone punishments like chopping
off a petty thief’s hands, primarily because we view the disproportion
between the harm caused and the sanction imposed to neglect elementary
justice.
Only restitution can fully establish proportionality between the
crime committed and the sanction imposed because only restitution treats
criminal law as a matter of accounting, rather than as an expression of
philosophical convictions.  Sentencing guidelines and mandatory mini-
mum and maximum sentences try to approximate this sense of propor-
tionality.  Ultimately, however, they must fail because, as Barnett states,
46 Cf. Rothbard, Punishment and Proportionality, supra note 38, at 262–64 (noting that
restitution places a ceiling on punishment, limited by the criminal defendant’s own rights,
which the criminal does not forfeit just by committing a crime).
47 See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 66–68, 70 (2003) (reinstating conviction).
48 See Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 265–66 (1980) (affirming conviction).
49 See ROTHBARD, ETHICS OF LIBERTY, supra note 22, at 80–81.  However, the victim
could seek less than the upper limit, because the victim is always free to not exercise any of his
or her rights. See Rothbard, Punishment and Proportionality, supra note 38, at 263–64.
50 See ROTHBARD, ETHICS OF LIBERTY, supra note 22, at 80.
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“[t]here is no rational connection between a term of imprisonment and
the harm caused the victim.”51  To state that a first-time robbery is worth
five years in prison is to make an arbitrary philosophical judgment di-
vorced from the facts of the harm itself.  No one would consider making
similarly fixed damage awards for, say, first-time contract breaches.
Rather, they would try to compute actual damages—which is what resti-
tution does too.
But when criminal law moves away from the civil law’s focus on
individual accounting and embraces abstract philosophy, there should be
no surprise that we end up with punishments as dissonant as those seen
today, where people spend years in prison, their futures ruined, for of-
fenses that, frequently, could have been easily paid off in monetary dam-
ages.  When criminal law becomes a question of philosophy, it can
generate as many outcomes as there are competing philosophies, includ-
ing quite harsh ones.  Restitution, on the other hand, places a natural
limit on what the criminal law can impose and thus places a powerful
brake on the rise of the prison state.
2. The Possibility of “Psychic Restitution” Facilitates Victim-
Offender Bargaining
Critics might argue that giving victims the option of exacting
psychic restitution could actually make a restitutionary system substan-
tially more punitive than the current one.  That is, it could give blood-
thirsty victims, rather than disinterested prosecutors, the option of what
remedies to seek.
However, this view gets the situation exactly backwards.  Allowing
for psychic restitution actually increases the odds that victim and crimi-
nal will be able to negotiate to a mutually satisfactory solution.  In dis-
cussing an analogous situation, the medievalist William Ian Miller
argued that, in Biblical “eye-for-an-eye” societies—when a crime victim
could literally extract an aggressor’s eye or a pound of flesh in compen-
sation for a crime—the mere option of such retributive punishment actu-
ally served to increase the victim’s bargaining power for the real goal of
getting better monetary compensation.52  If the law sets the loss of a de-
fendant’s eye as the upper limit for a given crime, the removal of the eye,
though possibly satisfying, is not monetarily worth very much to the vic-
tim, but avoiding eye-loss is worth a huge amount to the defendant.
Thus, the defendant will have an incentive to scrape together as much
51 Barnett, Restitution, supra note 22, at 284.
52 WILLIAM IAN MILLER, EYE FOR AN EYE 48–50 (2006); see also Bruce Benson, Resti-
tution in Theory and Practice, 12 J. LIBERTARIAN STUD. 75, 78 (1996) (asserting that, histori-
cally, this is how restitutionary systems developed).
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money as possible to overcome the victim’s bloodlust, settle the case,
and avoid the gruesome penalty.53
Today, the removal of a defendant’s eye is off the table.  But the
same principle holds.  When retributive punishment is an option under a
restitutionary system, the victim certainly gains from being in a better
bargaining position, but the defendant also gains.  Whereas, under the
current system, the defendant is subject to inflexible judicial edicts,
under the system that Miller describes the defendant gains the flexibility
that dealing with another private party allows.  The defendant can bar-
gain for a restitution order that would be better than an unduly retributive
penalty would be for both the defendant and for the victim.  For that
reason, we would expect to see relatively few cases of retributive restitu-
tion actually carried out, but its shadow would powerfully facilitate in-
terparty bargaining.
3. Restitution Reestablishes the Criminal’s Humanity
As a final benefit, restitution would “rehumanize” the criminal.54
Whereas now many criminal defendants and prisoners think of the justice
system as something done to them by higher forces beyond their con-
trol,55 restitution is a great equalizer.  Of course, certain differences in
bargaining power, ability to litigate, and so on, would still exist, but by
treating criminals as being of the same moral status as the victim, and
placing them in the position of a debtor who need only repay the debt,
rather than of a monster to be condemned and locked away, restitution
would do much to alleviate the social stigma that follows criminal de-
fendants.56  Society could—and probably should—morally condemn the
more heinous crimes.  But it should not deny the criminal’s own moral
status, which follows simply from being human, and which the current
system, with its focus on locking away the morally blameworthy, tends
to implicitly deny.  Restitution, as Giorgio Del Vecchio noted, affirms
the “great truth” of modern philosophy, “that the human being in himself
possesses a supreme value and hence must not be treated as a simple
means to an end extraneous to himself.”57  In a society that brands one in
53 See MILLER, supra note 52, at 48.
54 On the current dehumanization of the criminal, cf. LOURY, supra note 7, at 24–25
(“[T]he discourse surrounding punishment policy invariably discounts the humanity of the
thieves, drug sellers, prostitutes, rapists, and, yes, those whom we put to death.  It gives insuf-
ficient weight to the welfare, the humanity, of those who are knitted together with offenders in
webs of social and psychic affiliation.”)
55 For an example of this mentality, see DEMICO BOOTHE, WHY ARE SO MANY BLACK
MEN IN PRISON? 9 (2007).
56 See ABEL & MARSH, supra note 31, at 17–18.
57 Del Vecchio, supra note 37, at 76.
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fifty of its own citizens as criminals, this is a lesson that we need to
remember.
C. Objections to Restitution
Before leaving the topic of theoretical restitution, it is necessary to
discuss the remaining significant objections to a pure restitutionary sys-
tem.  These are the objections that people most often raise in debates
over restitution.  For that reason alone, I believe that it is necessary to
address them.
However, it is important to remember that even if restitution suffers
from problems such as judgment-proof criminals or lessened deterrence
(which, as discussed below, I do not believe it does in any significant
sense), that is not necessarily a conclusive argument against it.  Given
that the current system leads to its own problems, such as mass incarcer-
ation and victim under-compensation, the real question is whether the net
benefits of restitution outweigh the net benefits of the current system—
which my entire Note, thus far, argues in the affirmative.  Accordingly,
this section is primarily meant to demonstrate that some of the skeptics’
technical concerns are not in fact serious obstacles to realizing the net
benefits of restitution.
1. What About Judgment-Proof Criminals?
What if the criminal cannot pay?  As discussed earlier in part II.A.,
victims can theoretically take their restitution through retributive punish-
ment.  But would this mean that only poor criminals would be retribu-
tively punished and that the rest could pay their way out?
Well, it is certainly possible that some victims would rather send
their assailants to be punished with a prison sentence than speculate on
the unlikely event that they could be repaid.  Nevertheless, even if the
only options available were penal retribution or immediate repayment,
poor criminals would be no worse off than they are now, when they are
forced into prison without even the option of paying off their crimes.  At
least under restitution they would have the option of avoiding prison.
But, more fundamentally, to assume that either immediate payment
or traditional retributive punishments are the only options for convicted
criminals neglects the transformative effect that restitution would likely
have on a free market.  Just as the imposition of bail led to a market for
bail bonds, the imposition of restitution would likely lead to a greater
market for something like crime insurance;58 people could buy insurance
to protect against someday becoming a victim of crime.  If the policy-
58 See Barnett, Restitution, supra note 22, at 290 (discussing the uses of crime
insurance).
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holder did in fact fall victim to a crime, and the nature of the crime does
not allow for the prompt return of stolen goods, then the insurance com-
pany could quickly pay a lump sum to the policy-holder in exchange for
the right to receive the policy-holder’s restitution payments from the
criminal.59
Such an arrangement would be economically efficient because it
would shift the burden of the risk of default or of time-delayed payments
from a private individual to a large company that is better able to manage
risk.60  In most cases, collection from the criminal could take place
through something resembling the modern probation system, where the
criminal would be technically free, but closely monitored to make sure
that all payments are being made.
According to proponents of restitution, prison would only enter the
picture in extreme cases where the criminal posed a high risk of trying to
escape payment.61  In these cases, the criminal would be placed in a
prison-like holding facility where he or she would work off all criminal
debts.62  But this prison system would likely be preferable to the current
system because the time spent in prison would become more “self-deter-
minative;” that is, the sentence length would depend on how hard the
prisoner worked or on what kinds of work the prisoner was able to get
into.  By contrast, the current system forces the prisoner to wait out a
fixed number of years as decreed from above, thus emphasizing the pris-
oner’s powerlessness in determining the prisoner’s own fate.63  Restitu-
tionary prisons would also be quite limited, because they would only
house prisoners who had a high risk of attempting to escape payment.64
Though such a conception of the prison as a “workhouse” will likely
raise the contempt of many intellectuals and other self-described humani-
tarians, from a prisoner’s perspective it may be preferable to the current
system.  It appears that prisoners welcome any opportunity to escape the
monotony of a tiny cell, even if it is only to do what many intellectuals
would find to be degrading labor.65
59 Cf. id. (discussing various insurance schemes aimed at quicker restitution payments).
60 Cf. id. (noting that “[t]he insurance company would be permitted to supervise the
offender and mark his progress” in making restitution payment better than the victim could).
61 See id. at 289.
62 See id.; Del Vecchio, supra note 37, at 73–74.
63 See Barnett, Restitution, supra note 22, at 294.
64 Restitutionary prisons would be further limited because “victimless” criminals, like
prostitutes or drug-dealers, would have no one to pay restitution to, and therefore could not
even be a proper subject of a restitutionary criminal law.
65 See MARIE L. GRIFFIN, THE USE OF FORCE BY DETENTION OFFICERS 42–44 (2001)
(discussing the chain gang’s popularity in a famous Arizona jail); Chuck Colson, Justice That
Restores: A Paradigm-Shift in Criminal Justice Practices, 36 GEORGETOWN L.J. ANN. REV.
CRIM. PROC. iii, x (2007) (recalling, from the author’s own prison experience, that “[i]dleness
is one of the most debilitating aspects of prison life”).
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2. Does Restitution Adequately Deter or Incapacitate Criminals?
A frequent charge against restitution is that it cannot adequately de-
ter crime.  Its opponents argue that money damages alone will be insuffi-
cient to deter crime, but will instead simply allow the criminal to
continue to commit crimes as long as the criminal can pay them off.
But, though critics may speak of restitution as allowing criminals to
“pay off” crimes, this is actually a misleading phrase.  Restitution does
not recognize the criminal’s right to buy the ability to aggress against
victims; it merely seeks to repair a violation of the victim’s rights after
that violation has occurred.66  It is therefore only a remedy, and does not
preclude preventative anticrime measures, even, or perhaps especially,
against the crimes that could be easily paid off.  But, even if we do mis-
takenly characterize restitution payments as “buying” the right to commit
a crime, restitution still does not markedly differ from the current system,
where, for instance, five years in prison could be viewed as the “price”
paid for the “right” to commit a certain crime.
Moreover, although there has been no opportunity to empirically
compare restitution’s deterrent effect to that of a public-wrong system’s
deterrent effect operating under similar conditions, there are reasons to
believe that restitution could deter crime as well as or even better than
the current system.  Monetary sanctions are not to be taken lightly, espe-
cially among criminals of scarce means.  Indeed, tort law and contract
law proceed partly on the assumption that they are not in fact taken
lightly and do serve as adequate deterrents.67  When it comes to property
crimes, the imposition of monetary sanctions would seem to eliminate
incentives to commit crime to a greater degree than a prison sentence,
because the criminal would have to repay whatever gain he or she re-
ceived, plus consequential damages, thus eliminating all gains from theft
or embezzlement.  Monetary gains, of course, are not eliminated by
prison time; the two belong to wholly separate classes.  Moreover, resti-
66 See ROTHBARD, ETHICS OF LIBERTY, supra note 22, at 241.
67 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 142–43 (2d ed. 1977)
(arguing that tort damages for negligence are just as important in their deterrent effect as they
are in their compensatory effect).  Edward Banfield, however, believes that crimes tend to be
committed by people with very high time preference (i.e., high present-orientedness and little
thought for the future) and doubts the deterrent effect of any form of criminal law. See Ed-
ward C. Banfield, Present-Orientedness and Crime, in ASSESSING THE CRIMINAL: RESTITU-
TION, RETRIBUTION, AND THE LEGAL PROCESS 133, 142 (Randy E. Barnett & John Hagel III
eds., 1977); see also Colson, supra note 65, at iv (2007) (“In thirty years of work with prison-
ers, I have never met an inmate who thought he would get caught, and certainly most did not
have the foggiest idea what the penalties for their crime were when they committed the
crime.”).  If this is true, the analogy of deterrence in criminal law and civil law is false.  But if
it is true, then the current system would deter just as inadequately as restitution, and criminal
law would become primarily an ex post system in which a certain theory’s merits would de-
pend on how well it dealt with crime after the fact, thus rendering deterrence largely irrelevant.
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tution’s deterrent effect would be especially powerful if, as it probably
should, it forced the losing party to pay the other side’s legal costs68 or if
it were accompanied by increased criminal enforcement, so that the like-
lihood of getting caught increased.69
It is also not necessarily true that, as many proponents of the current
system tacitly assume, prison time is a great deterrent to crime.  Though
we cannot know how many people decide not to commit crimes after
weighing their costs, we can look at current recidivism rates for evidence
as to how effectively the current system deters.  These statistics paint a
grim picture and provide at least some support for the often-expressed
belief that, rather than deterring crime, prison actually breeds and per-
petuates it.  Currently, within three years of leaving prison, 42.7% of
people convicted of homicide are rearrested and 16.6% are reincarcer-
ated.70  Those with fewer than two prior arrests and no prior imprison-
ments have a 31% rearrest rate and a 9.9% reincarceration rate.71  When
we look at those convicted of robbery, burglary, and similar crimes, the
recidivism rates are nearly double in each respective category.72  Perhaps
a system where punishment was less harsh and stigmatic would give us a
much lower recidivism rate.  At any rate, it should be unsurprising that a
system that relegates people to years spent in a cell alongside other
criminals does not prepare its inmates for life in the outside world.
But what about billionaires?  How would they be incentivized under
restitution?  It is of course possible that certain rich people would be less
deterred under a restitutionary system than they are under a public-wrong
system, especially when it comes to crimes like rape or murder, the per-
ceived benefits of which, unlike property crimes, cannot be erased by
forced compensation.
Nevertheless, this objection ignores practical reality.  Overwhelm-
ingly, violent crimes tend to be committed by the poor,73 whereas
68 See Barnett, Restitution, supra note 22, at 294.
69 Cf. Gary Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON.
169, 178 (1968) (noting that changes in probability of conviction may deter more than severity
of punishment).  However, this deterrent effect would be offset by the generally high time
preference that many criminals possess. See sources cited supra note 67.
70 Prisoner Recidivism, BUREAU JUST. STAT., http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=
datool&surl=/recidivism/index.cfm# (last visited Dec. 20, 2012) (click on “Analysis,” check
all boxes under “Demographics” and “Criminal History,” and check “Homicide” under “Sen-
tence Characteristics”).
71 Id. (follow the directions, supra note 70, but under “Criminal History” click only
“< 2” prior arrests and “No” prior imprisonment).
72 Id. (follow the directions, supra notes 70 & 71, but click “Robbery,” “Burglary,” “Lar-
ceny—Theft and MVT,” and “Other Property Crime” instead of “Homicide”).
73 See Elizabeth Brown & Mike Males, Does Age or Poverty Level Best Predict Criminal
Arrest and Homicide Rates?: A Preliminary Investigation, 8 JUST. POL’Y J. 1, 17–23 (2011),
available at http://www.cjcj.org/files/Does_age.pdf; Karen Heimer, Socioeconomic Status,
Subcultural Definitions, and Violent Delinquency, 75 SOC. FORCES 799, 817 (1997).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CJP\22-3\CJP308.txt unknown Seq: 20  2-MAY-13 10:16
752 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 22:733
wealthy people tend to commit nonviolent property crimes,74 like embez-
zlement, which restitution could very effectively deter.  Of course, the
crime rates for different socioeconomic groups will differ depending on
what type of legal and social structure is in place.  But we could reasona-
bly expect that, regardless of the system in place, it makes the most sense
that the poor will commit violent crimes and that the rich will commit
nonviolent ones.  Whereas the harshness of the lower class lives can
often lead to violent outcomes, the rich have very little to gain from
violent crime.  In fact, to the extent that they care about maintaining their
standing in the community and their sources of wealth, the rich have
much to lose.  It is unlikely that even someone like Bill Gates could
withstand the social scorn and ostracism that would accompany revela-
tions of serial killing.  After all, the argument against deterrence assumes
not that rich people will kill in secret, but that they will openly do so as
long as they can pay restitution.  It assumes, therefore, that only legal
sanctions can deter crimes, whereas, in fact, social sanctions can be just
as effective.75
But there is a stronger argument for restitution’s deterrent effect on
the rich.  If, as discussed above, a restitutionary system allows for retrib-
utive punishment as a form of psychic compensation, then restitution
could effectively deter even those few wealthy people who do commit
violent crimes.  It would achieve this high deterrence even if the victim
happened to be very poor and therefore, standing alone, had very little
economic leverage.  If a poor victim is able to threaten a wealthy crimi-
nal with a prison term as “psychic restitution” and the criminal refuses a
satisfactory settlement, then the victim could simply have the criminal
locked away for a fixed prison term.  The threat of retributive punish-
ment would therefore likely deter crime to the same extent as the current
system, but would do so in a way that vindicates the victim’s right to
compensation, because any retribution would only be meted out if the
victim considered it the best option available.  Once again, the specter of
psychic restitution would prevent a wealthy criminal from buying off the
victim—or a murdered victim’s heirs—at too low a price, and would
74 See, e.g., Cynthia Barnett, The Measurement of White-Collar Crime Using Uniform
Crime Reporting (UCR) Data, FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION (U.S. Dep’t of Just. D.C.), at 1, 5,
available at http://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/whitecollarforweb.pdf (last visited Jan. 18, 2013).
75 To take one prominent example, the most serious damages that O.J. Simpson suffered
were not from his criminal trial (where he was found not guilty) or his civil trial (whose
damages judgments he evaded), but from society’s belief that he was in fact a murderer, which
led to an end of a lucrative career and to cancelled book deals. See, e.g., News Corporation
Cancels Simpson Book and TV Special, NEWS CORP., http://www.newscorp.com/news/news_
320.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2012) (cancelling Simpson’s book publication because the pub-
lisher agreed “with the American public that this was an ill-considered project”).  Of course,
the threat of social ostracism might not deter everyone.  But neither do legal sanctions.
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give a poor victim strong bargaining power even vis-a`-vis a wealthy
criminal.
Another related objection is that, because restitution is primarily
concerned with making victims whole, it lacks a method of incapacitat-
ing violent offenders who we fear are too dangerous to be let out of
prison.  This much, at least, is true: a restitutionary system could not
accept the utilitarian goal of incapacitation through extended incarcera-
tion, because imposing a lengthened sentence based only on a fear that
the criminal will strike again is to punish the criminal disproportionately
to the harm actually caused, even if the criminal also pays
compensation.76
Nonetheless, we might still see some form of incapacitation as an
incident of restitution.  Because criminals who cannot afford to compen-
sate their victims would be forced to work off their debts, possibly in
prison, then, in practice, restitution would tend to incapacitate the most
heinous criminals for a long time anyway, as their crimes would typically
take the longest to work off.  Moreover, those who commit violent
crimes would be more likely to have to work off their debts in a restitu-
tionary prison rather than under a probation system, because their
penchant for violence would usually, though not necessarily, indicate a
high risk of engaging in behavior that could lead to defaulting on their
restitutionary obligations.77  However, promoting extended incarceration
for violent criminals is not inherent in restitution; it is merely a likely
side-benefit.  Nor is it a compromise toward utilitarian penal theory to
recognize it as a commendable aspect of restitution.  To the extent that
restitution leads to long-term incarceration of violent criminals, it only
does so in a way that respects the rights of both victims and criminals.
Utilitarianism—or any other public-wrong-oriented criminal system—
does not.
3. Is Restitution Amoral?
As discussed above, the dominant approach to crime holds that
crimes are those acts that shock society’s deepest moral convictions.78
Restitution, meanwhile, takes morality out of the picture and only looks
at repairing the victim’s harm.  For that reason, legal scholar Stephen
Garvey calls it “atonement without punishment”79 because, in his view, it
76 But see Barnett, Getting Even, supra note 40, at 160–65 (arguing in favor of some
preventative detention).
77 See supra notes 58-65 and accompanying text.
78 See supra notes 24–27 and accompanying text.
79 Stephen P. Garvey, Punishment as Atonement, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1801, 1840 (1999).
Note that what I call “restitution,” Garvey calls “libertarianism.”  However, in this context, the
substance of the two terms is the same. See id. at 1844–46 (describing “libertarianism” as
essentially parallel to the “restitution” defended here).  I hasten to add that, while many restitu-
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denies the moral harm that crime causes and focuses solely on repairing
the material harm to the victim.80  Invoking the need for moral standards,
Garvey concludes, “[R]estitution alone will not make amends for the
harm [the criminal] has done.  For that, you need punishment.”81
But, while it is indeed true that restitution does not care about ab-
stract notions of morality when it comes to criminal adjudication, it is
incorrect to call it morally neutral.  On the contrary, restitution implicitly
recognizes one of the fundamental facts of moral law: that human beings
have the right to be free from forceful external invasions and, if that right
is violated, they deserve a personal remedy.  Therefore, restitution indi-
rectly affirms the fundamental moral code of individual rights,82 which is
what makes crimes like murder or rape so socially repugnant in the first
place.  Society condemns such crimes primarily because of the harm they
cause to innocent individuals,83 so it is unclear how treating them as
“public wrongs” more effectively expresses our collective disgust than
treating them as “private wrongs.”  In fact, because calling them “public
wrongs” denies individuals a remedy for violations of their rights, the
current system weakens the support for individual rights on which the
prohibitions against murder and rape were founded in the first place.
Therefore, if the aim of criminal law is to reaffirm social morality, resti-
tution functions better than the current system, or variations thereof.
However, it could be objected that restitution still neglects the crim-
inal’s desert and thus fails to account for the moral differences between,
for instance, someone whose car struck a pedestrian accidentally and
someone who struck the pedestrian with the intent of murder.84  But why
must the community interpose its own conception of blameworthiness in
a conflict between a pedestrian and a driver?  Why must one driver be
punished more than the other when the harm in both cases is the same?
tion theorists are libertarians, the two need not be synonymous.  Garvey recognizes this. See,
e.g., id. at 1844 n.195 (discussing libertarians who oppose restitution).  Similarly, Abel and
Marsh justify restitution on un-libertarian, welfare-statist grounds. ABEL & MARSH, supra
note 31, at 4 (discussing the need to distribute the burden of crime throughout society and the
need for the state to pay back restitution to the victim).
80 See Garvey, supra note 79, at 1844–46; see also Hospers, supra note 32, at 204–05
(asserting the superiority of retributivism over restitution because restitution neglects the crim-
inal’s “desert”); Richard C. Boldt, Restitution, Criminal Law, and the Ideology of Individual-
ity, 77 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 969, 1015–16 (1986) (arguing that restitution fails to
account for the purpose of the criminal law: to reinforce society’s ideology as a means of
setting boundaries on permissible group behavior).
81 See Garvey, supra note 79, at 1846.
82 Ironically, this is exactly what Richard Boldt claimed that restitution cannot do. See
Boldt, supra note 80.
83 See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 24, at 238 (“The crimes of assault and battery, rape, and
the like are all concerned with the inviolability of the person . . . .”).
84 Cf. Roger Pilon, Criminal Remedies: Restitution, Punishment, or Both?, 88 ETHICS
348, 350–51 (1978) (finding it absurd to treat accidental car accidents the same as intentional
attacks).
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Finally, in the criminal case, why should the community’s preferred rem-
edy trump that of the victim, who, by seeking restitution, would be stat-
ing his or her own preference for compensation instead of punishment?
III. THE OPT-OUT PROVISION
A. Outlines of an Opt-Out Provision
Having discussed the theory of criminal restitution, it is now time to
discuss how this system could be implemented.  In considering whether
the public would prefer a restitutionary system to the current one, Randy
Barnett stated that the only way to test public sympathy would be to see
which system people would voluntarily choose, given the option of
adopting either one.85  I share Barnett’s faith in the power of free choice,
so I offer the following proposal.  Hopefully, it will serve as an outline
for a realistic proposal to reintroduce restitution into the public con-
sciousness and thereby gain it some public support.
The proposal itself is quite simple, though it requires acceptance of
what is considered today a quite radical proposition: that the victim’s
rights in criminal adjudication exceed those of the state.  Essentially, but
with room for technical modification, I propose that after an arrest, but
before entering a plea, the victim and the defendant be given the option,
by mutual agreement, to remove their case entirely from the criminal
court system and into whatever alternative venue they choose.  The pros-
ecutor would only come into the picture if the parties fail to reach an
agreement or if they agree to keep their dispute in criminal court.
In opting out of the criminal courts, the victim and the defendant
leave behind the entire system of prosecutors, public defenders, and pro-
cedural complexities.  But they would gain many other options for
resolving their case.  They could decide to move it to civil court, to a
private arbitration board, or to some other alternative dispute resolution
mechanism.  Or, once the parties removed the case, the victim could sim-
ply decide to drop it and to allow the defendant to go free, which would
be helpful in cases where the victim forgave the defendant, but where the
government still planned to prosecute.
Because both the victim and the defendant must agree to opt out, we
know that the decision to do so will be Pareto optimal; it will make
neither party worse off and may make at least one of the parties better
off.  If this were not the case and the agreement left one of the parties
worse off, then all else being equal, we would expect the parties to refuse
agreement and to allow the traditional criminal courts to keep the case.
For instance, if the defendant were arrested without receiving a Mi-
randa warning, or without some other constitutional protection, then the
85 See Barnett, Restitution, supra note 22, at 295.
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defendant would rationally refuse to opt out, because such a violation is
cause for a dismissal in a criminal case, but not in a civil case or a case
before a private arbitration board.  Likewise, if the defendant believed
that he or she could win in a criminal case under the heightened “beyond
a reasonable doubt” standard of guilt, but could not win under the lower
standard in a civil case, he or she would likely refuse to opt out.  If the
defendant could expect a more lenient sentence in criminal court—
whether through plea-bargaining or because he or she personally consid-
ered prison time preferable to paying restitution—we would expect the
defendant once again to not opt out.
The victim might also refuse to opt out.  For one thing, even if the
victim has access to a low-cost arbitration board, allowing a prosecutor
to keep the case will cost the victim nothing, which leads to a bias
against opting out, especially when the likelihood of winning a private
case is low.86  Moreover, we have discussed that “psychic restitution” is
a valid form of compensation.  But civil courts and private arbitration
boards do not have the power to inflict retributive punishment on a crimi-
nal.87  Therefore, if the victim would rather be compensated psychically
by seeing the criminal punished in prison, then we would expect that the
victim would refuse to opt out.  Of course, if the victim wanted psychic
restitution by making the criminal do some form of rehabilitative service,
rather than through retributive punishment, this could likely be accom-
plished and enforced by noncriminal courts or arbitration boards through
some sort of private contract, probably enforced by a liquidated damages
provision in case the criminal later refused to cooperate.
Finally, the victim would have a lesser incentive to opt out in cases
involving relatively small property crimes because many states have vic-
tim-restitution laws that require the criminal to return stolen property.88
An opt-out provision would therefore likely have the biggest impact re-
garding violent crimes and larger property crimes like fraud and embez-
zlement which, for practical purposes, are difficult to receive
compensation for under state and federal restitution laws—laws that still
place the state’s interests ahead of those of the victim and tend to only
allow recovery of small monetary amounts.89  However, because victims
86 The defendant could face the same incentive against opting out, because the criminal
courts offer defendants a public defense attorney.  Of course, in either case, the litigation
comes at a cost, because the victim and the defendant pay taxes to support the criminal court
system.  However, because their tax burdens will not change based on their opt-out decisions,
this would not be expected to factor into their calculations.
87 See, e.g., Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 236–38 (1896) (holding that
only the judicial branch can sentence a criminal defendant to a punishment like imprisonment).
88 See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 60.27(b) (McKinney 2009); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13,
§ 7043(b)(1) (2009).
89 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1202.4(b)-(c) (West 2004) (capping the recoverable amount
at $10,000 for felonies and $1,000 for misdemeanors and leaving the decision of whether to
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could theoretically seek restitution for emotional distress, consequential
damages, and other intangible harms in a private venue, they would still
have some incentive to opt out even from crimes covered by victim-
restitution laws.
The above possibilities aside, there are nonetheless strong reasons to
believe that many victims and criminal defendants would in fact choose
to opt out of the criminal system.  The primary reasons have been dis-
cussed at length: for the victim, the possibility of compensation; for the
defendant, the possibility of avoiding the violent, overcrowded prison
system and the social stigma that it imposes.  Though we have scant evi-
dence of modern restitutionary regimes, we can find some historical sup-
port for restitution’s popularity.  For instance, in medieval England,
when the King assumed more powers over the criminal law and took
away compensation for victims, victims became less and less willing to
report crimes.  In fact, in order to force victims into the public courts, the
King ultimately had to criminalize the mere acts of settling crimes out of
court and of failing to prosecute.90
Unless people in the Middle Ages were significantly more material-
istic than people today, there is some reason to believe that restitution
would be popular, while an opt-out provision could serve as a practical91
first step to a full restitutionary regime.  Critics often claim that restitu-
tion is just an academic proposal that ignores the existing legal distinc-
tions between crime and tort and the centuries of reliance built thereon.
Richard Epstein, for instance, admonished that legal changes must be
made “by those whose knowledge is not only of what ought to be, but
what in fact is.”92  But an opt-out provision short-circuits some of these
criticisms.  It seeks no overhaul of the law beyond the mere act of codi-
fying the provision itself.  As such, an opt-out provision would leave
require repayment to the judge’s discretion); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.089 (West 2010) (limiting
recovery for bodily injury to things like medical and funeral expenses and lost income, but not
for other reasonably foreseeable consequential damages or for pain and suffering); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 13, § 7043(b)(2) (2009) (capping restitution at $10,000 for victim’s crime-related
death).
90 See BENSON, supra note 22, at 62.  Until modern times, English victims themselves
would prosecute criminal cases, even though they would not receive any restitution from a
guilty verdict. See id. at 68, 75.
91 The proposal is practical because, if implemented, I believe that it could lead to a more
restitutionary regime while maximizing the individual parties’ social utility, and therefore
causing minimal disruption in the legal order.  I do not mean that it is a “middle of the road”
proposal or that it stands a good chance of being adopted by state legislatures.  How to suc-
cessfully advance the proposal in the political sphere is a subject for another article.
92 Epstein, supra note 24, at 257; see also Ybo Buruma, Doubts on the Upsurge of the
Victim’s Role in Criminal Law, in CRIME, VICTIMS AND JUSTICE: ESSAYS ON PRINCIPLES AND
PRACTICE 1, 14 (Hendrik Kaptein & Marijke Malsch eds., 2004) (arguing that restorative jus-
tice, a restitution-like system, could only play a very limited role in the criminal law, and only
in certain peripheral cases).
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intact the procedural and substantive differences between criminal law
and tort law—such as mental state, burdens of proof, and differing dis-
covery rules—that Epstein believed posed insurmountable obstacles to a
unification of crime and tort.93  Instead of sweepingly overhauling and
unifying the two present systems, an opt-out provision would simply al-
low the parties to choose which of the two competing systems they pre-
fer.  Of course, allowing a choice in criminal law does present a sharp
departure from our current situation.  But, because the proposal relies on
existing arrangements in civil courts and private alternative dispute reso-
lution, it cannot be said to be impractical or to substitute theoretical phi-
losophy for practical legal analysis.  And because it relies on the parties’
mutual consent, it cannot be said to foist an academic theory on an un-
willing population.
One might object, however, that the victim actually has nothing to
gain from an opt-out system, because the victim can already sue for
money damages in civil court.  That is, right now the victim can have his
or her cake and eat it too: the victim can see the criminal sent to prison
and, on top of that, seek money damages for any loss.
But, while it is true that the victim can indeed sue for money dam-
ages in civil court, that is still less satisfactory from the victim’s perspec-
tive than opting for full-scale restitution.  And it is less satisfactory even
if the victim’s only motivation is crass economic self-interest.94  The
very existence of criminal punishment diminishes the defendant’s ability
to pay any restitution at all.  Most people rely on their jobs, or their
ability to find jobs, for their livelihood.  Someone serving a prison sen-
tence not only has no means of making money to pay for civil damages,
but also has strikingly diminished job prospects upon release from
prison.95  Therefore, if a victim wants payment, the rational option is to
try to maintain the payer’s solvency, not to send the payer to a prison that
will dramatically erode such solvency.  Moreover, for many profession-
als, commission of a crime is also grounds to lose their license to practice
their profession.96  So, once again, those who avoid the criminal justice
93 See Epstein, supra note 24, at 255–56.
94 I do not address here the moral question of whether it is justifiable to subject the
criminal to both civil and criminal penalties for a single crime.  I am inclined to believe that it
is not. See supra notes 49–50 and accompanying text.  But here, I assume for the sake of
argument that the victim is only concerned with personal material benefits.
95 See LOURY, supra note 7, at 19–21.
96 See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6102(a) (West 2012) (disbarring attorneys con-
victed of felonies or crimes involving moral turpitude); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH OCC. § 14-
404(b)(1) (revoking medical license of physicians convicted of crimes involving moral turpi-
tude and other health related offenses); see also Eric Dexheimer, Texas Ex-Offenders Are
Denied Job Licenses, STATESMAN (Apr. 11, 2011, 5:22 AM), http://www.statesman.com/news/
statesman-investigates/texas-ex-offenders-are-denied-job-licenses-1389337.html?printArticle
=y.  Summaries of state laws revoking licenses for each profession are plentiful online.  For a
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system avoid legal barriers to their future ability to pay restitution, at
least under the current law.  Finally, the duplicative costs of having to
defend against both a criminal action and a civil action are not insubstan-
tial and can also adversely impact a criminal’s ability to pay restitution.
Therefore, even if victims can receive compensation in the civil arena, it
is in their interests to find alternatives to the prison-based criminal sys-
tem, to the extent that they value monetary compensation.  Opting out of
the criminal system can therefore provide benefits that the traditional
route of seeking civil remedies after a criminal case cannot.
But, to say that one side or another has nothing to gain from opting
out is somewhat to miss the point.  If the sides do not have anything to
gain, then they simply will not opt out, and will be in the same position
that they are in now.  The opt-out provision would then just be a mean-
ingless, but harmless, legal option.  Only if both sides consider restitution
to be a net improvement from the current situation will they decide to opt
out.  Accordingly, an opt-out system will only lead to more restitution if
restitution is actually popular.  If it does lead to more restitution, then we
can be assured that restitution is something that real people actually de-
sire, and is not just an intellectual thought experiment.
B. Contemporary Trends Favoring an Opt-Out Provision
1. Arbitration and Mediation
Contemporary trends also favor the feasibility of an opt-out propo-
sal, and indicate that it is not as radical as it might first appear.  For one
thing, private arbitration (in which the parties submit their case to a pri-
vate tribunal) and private mediation (in which a mediator helps the par-
ties negotiate a mutually satisfactory agreement) have exploded in
popularity during the last few decades as alternatives to the slow and
cumbersome public court system.97  The drive toward such private
representative example, see George Coppolo et al., Consequences of a Felony Conviction Re-
garding Employment, CONN. GEN. ASSEMBLY (Apr. 5, 2005), http://www.cga.ct.gov/2005/rpt/
2005-r-0311.htm.
97 See, e.g., Allied-Bruce Terminix Co. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 268, 270–73 (1995)
(interpreting the Federal Arbitration Act broadly to overcome state anti-arbitration laws); Stu-
art H. Bompey et al., The Attack on Arbitration and Mediation of Employment Disputes, 13
LAB. LAW. 21, 21–26 (1997) (discussing the benefits of using arbitration, as opposed to public
courts, for settling employment disputes); FULBRIGHT & JAWORSKI, IDENTIFYING TRENDS IN
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION SINCE 2004, at 2–3 (2011), available at http://www.fulbright.
com/images/publications/Arbitration.pdf (discussing arbitration’s growing use and popularity
in international transactions over the last few years, and concluding that these trends will
continue into the future); Royal Furgeson, Civil Jury Trials R.I.P.? Can It Actually Happen in
America?, 40 ST. MARY’S L.J. 795, 811–14, 863–66 (2009) (lamenting the decline of the civil
jury trial as due in large part to the rise in arbitration); George K. Walker, Family Law Arbitra-
tion: Legislation and Trends, 21 J. AM. ACAD. OF MATRIMONIAL LAW. 521, 649–50 (2008)
(discussing arbitration’s popularity in family law).  For a comprehensive historical discussion
of the explosion in arbitration through 1990, see BENSON, supra note 22, at 217–20.
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courts—which previously have been consigned only to the civil sphere—
has been influenced in large part by their perceived efficiencies as com-
pared to public courts.  Arbitration and mediation boards dispose of cases
more quickly than public civil courts,98 tend to be much cheaper than
civil litigation,99 and tend to be more informal and less legalistic than
civil litigation, thus reducing the need for high-priced lawyers with com-
plex procedural knowledge.100  Interestingly, even though most arbitra-
tion and mediation services cater to large businesses, the drive toward
private adjudication has taken smaller-scale forms as well.  For instance,
religious arbitration, though frequently maligned,101 has become popular
in Jewish and Muslim communities.  These communities are tending,
voluntarily and in ever-greater frequency, to opt out of the public court
system and to settle certain civil disputes among themselves in relatively
inexpensive102 private courts that reflect their own value systems and
uphold their own religious law.103
Private arbitration’s efficiency comes, in part, from the fact that,
unlike public courts, arbitration boards are subject to a profit-and-loss
system, meaning that they have strong incentives to adjust their supply of
98 See, e.g., BENSON, supra note 22, at 213.
99 See, e.g., Furgeson, supra note 97, at 813–14, 823 (describing the drive away from
public civil courts as motivated by high costs); see also, AM. ARB. ASS’N, Arbitration, availa-
ble at http://www.adr.org/arb_med (last visited Dec. 20, 2012) (advertising arbitration’s low
cost).  Others doubt that arbitration is as inexpensive or efficient as popularly believed. See,
e.g., Brian H. Corcoran & Mandie Landry, Considering Arbitration’s Costs and Dangers;
Avoiding Litigation Is Good, Right?  Not in Every Situation, CORP. COUNSEL (Aug. 24, 2007),
http://www.law.com/corporatecounsel/PubArticleCC.jsp?id=900005489106&Considering_Ar-
bitrations_Costs_and_Dangers&slreturn=20121118001301; JACKSON WILLIAMS, PUB. CITI-
ZEN, THE COSTS OF ARBITRATION (2002), available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/
ACF110A.pdf.  Benson argues, however, that many of the costs and inefficiencies that critics
cite actually come from the government’s overregulation of private arbitration boards, mean-
ing that cost is not an inherent problem in arbitration. See BENSON, supra note 22, at 222.
100 See, e.g., BENSON, supra note 22, at 220–22 (discussing the legal community’s historic
opposition to arbitration because of its efficient informality, based on relevant business cus-
toms, reduces the demand for the type of legalistic, procedural knowledge that lawyers
possess).
101 See, e.g., Daily Mail Reporter, Sharia Law Banned: Oklahoma to Become the First
U.S. State to Veto Use of Islamic Code, MAIL ONLINE (Nov. 2, 2010, 4:54 PM), http://www.
dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1325986/Sharia-law-banned-Oklahoma-US-state-veto-Islamic-
code.html; Maryam Namazie, What Isn’t Wrong With Sharia Law, GUARDIAN (July 5, 2010,
9:18 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/law/2010/jul/05/sharia-law-religious-courts; Scott
Shane, In Islamic Law, Gingrich Sees a Mortal Threat to U.S., N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 21, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/22/us/politics/in-shariah-gingrich-sees-mortal-threat-to-us.
html?pagewanted=all.
102 Compare BETH DIN OF AM., BETH DIN OF AMERICA FEE SCHEDULE, available at http:/
/www.bethdin.org/docs/Filing_Fee_Schedule.pdf (last visited Dec. 18, 2012) (costs of Jewish
arbitration), with Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, Defining the Problem of Cost in
Federal Civil Litigation, 60 DUKE L.J. 765, 770 (2010–2011) (costs of civil litigation).
103 See Lee Ann Bambach, The Enforceability of Arbitration Decisions Made by Muslim
Religious Tribunals: Examining the Beth Din Precedent, 25 J.L. & RELIGION 379, 384–87
(2010).
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adjudicatory services to match the current market demand.  For instance,
whereas case backlogs are the bane of public courts, private arbitration
boards can see them as reflecting an unmet demand that could be cap-
tured by expanding services and reaping higher profits.104  Thus, pri-
vately-run services have a tendency to match the supply of a good to its
demand; if they did not, and allowed huge backlogs to accumulate as
public courts do, they would be foregoing the opportunity to make sub-
stantial profits.  Of course, since public courts are not profit-making ac-
tors, they have no such incentive.  Moreover, because public courts are
technically free and open to anyone willing to incur various legal costs
and wait for a trial, they face a “tragedy of the commons,” where the
availability of a “free” good (justice services) incentivizes people to
overuse the court system, which creates backlogs and all that they entail.
If, conversely, the litigants had to pay for the use of the court system
themselves, they would be more likely to economize on litigation.105
But in the absence of a profit-and-loss system, public courts still
need some way of rationing their caseloads.  The important point is that,
without the use of market prices, they must rely on other inferior non-
price rationing mechanisms to allocate these cases.106  One prominent
rationing mechanism in the criminal context is the prosecutor’s discre-
tion on whether to dismiss or litigate a case, or to offer a plea bargain.107
However, even when prosecutorial discretion is exercised with the best
intentions, the prosecutor, without access to price signals, cannot possi-
bly know the population’s actual demand for which cases to prosecute,
and will tend to make such decisions in an arbitrary and ad hoc manner,
or in a manner based on hazy, individual notions of right and wrong,
rather than on an understanding of victim’s concrete demands—con-
veyed through price signals—for criminal justice.108
In this light, we may see that ubiquitous features of the contempo-
rary criminal justice system, such as the extremely high incidence of
104 Cf. BENSON, supra note 22, at 133 (describing the market-clearing capabilities of pri-
vate arbitration boards).
105 The classic formulation of the tragedy of the commons is Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy
of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
106 See BENSON, supra note 22, at 131.
107 Plea bargaining in particular makes the sheer volume of criminal cases manageable.
See, e.g., Frank Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 289,
298–322 (1983).
108 For a general discussion of the necessity of a price system for effective economic
calculation (i.e. for allocating scarce goods), which goes well beyond the scope of this Note,
see LUDWIG VON MISES, ECONOMIC CALCULATION IN THE SOCIALIST COMMONWEALTH (S. Ad-
ler trans., 1920), available at http://library.mises.org/books/Ludwig%20von%20Mises/Eco-
nomic%20Calculation%20in%20the%20Socialist%20Commonwealth_Vol_2.pdf; F.A. Hayek,
The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1945). For a discussion of subtle
but important differences between these two authors’ approaches, see Jospeh T. Salerno, Mises
and Hayek Dehomogenized, 6 REV. AUSTRIAN ECON. 113 (1993).
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plea-bargaining, are not inherent in criminal disputes, but are rather a
feature of publicly-run (i.e., non-price-rationed) dispute resolution.109
To the extent that parties opt for private arbitration, one benefit of an opt-
out system would likely be a shift to more efficient rationing methods,
where victims express their demand for which cases to prosecute based
on the prices they are willing to pay, and where arbitration boards, as
profit-maximizing market actors, contract or expand their services, real-
locate their capital goods, and raise or lower prices to fit the victim’s
concrete, demonstrable demand.
Finally, as an added bonus, if many people opt out, the burden on
the public court system would be lower, which would reduce the need for
non-price rationing mechanisms like plea-bargaining in the first place.110
But there are other ways to reap the benefits and efficiencies of
private arbitration in the criminal justice market.  Of course, because in
many cases neither the victim nor the defendant (after Gideon v.
Wainright111), bears much monetary cost from criminal litigation, arbi-
tration might be more expensive for the parties than sticking with the
current system.  Nevertheless, as long as criminal arbitration is allowed
to develop free of regulatory distortion and interference, we should ex-
pect to see a new market in low-cost, no-frills arbitration services to sat-
isfy the demands of parties who are willing to pay a little more up front
to get a speedier and more mutually satisfactory outcome than they could
get from the current system.  The fact that many criminal disputes in-
volve low-income people112—who are unlikely to be able to afford the
arbitration boards that today arbitrate large corporate transactions—
would spark a demand for a low-cost market, similar to how the demands
of Jewish and Muslim communities led to the creation of low-cost relig-
ious arbitration.  Because criminal arbitration boards would not need to
spend the time or possess the legal acumen to parse through legalistic
issues like mental state, admissibility of evidence, or due process consid-
erations relating to police conduct, but would rather only have to judge
109 See, e.g., BENSON, supra note 22, at 139 (“It is the congestion problem resulting from
non-price rationing that gives prosecutors and judges the discretionary power to selectively
ration trials and plea bargains.”).
110 For an argument that plea-bargaining is both unjust and economically inefficient, see
Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979 (1992).
111 372 U.S. 335 (1976) (finding a constitutional right to publicly-appointed counsel for
indigent defendants).
112 As an example of the sheer number of poor criminal defendants, the Department of
Justice’s Bureau of Justice Statistics’ most recent study found that the 22 states with state
public defender programs received a total of approximately 1.5 million cases of indigent de-
fendants in 2007.  Lynn Langton &  Donald Farole, State Public Defender Program, 2007,
BUREAU JUST. STAT (U.S. Dep’t of Just., D.C.), Sept. 2010, at 4, available at http://bjs.ojp.us
doj.gov/content/pub/pdf/spdp07.pdf.  Those states that also had a public defender program in
place in 1999 saw an average rise of 20% in their caseloads from 1999 to 2007. Id. at 19.
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guilt by their own privately-imposed standards113 and then tally the dam-
age done, arbitration could be handled cheaply and quickly by private
employees without formal legal training.
But what if the parties still cannot afford to arbitrate?  Well, a vic-
tim can always sell off his or her right to restitution to a third party.114  In
a free market, this could lead to interesting arrangements where a private
company could buy out the right to restitution from the victim and then
conduct arbitration itself.  Crime insurance could easily take on this func-
tion.115  Other variations of the same arrangement are also possible.  Per-
haps a party could take out a loan from a crime-bond company, while
keeping the right to restitution, and then repay the loan after the arbitra-
tion.  A party would be a good candidate for a loan if it had a high
probability of success and of regaining its legal costs, but did not have
the money to pay up front.  In fact, various medieval restitutionary sys-
tems actually used variations on just these financing schemes.  In Ice-
land, the victim was free to sell or give away his right to restitution,116
while in Ireland complex social groups called “sureties” would aid an in-
group victim in enforcing a claim, or guarantee an out-group victim full
restitution in the case that one of its own members defaulted.117  Free
markets have proven capable of changing to fit all kinds of different legal
conditions.  Critics of restitution should not dismiss that capability.
Indeed, it is likely that the only reason private arbitration boards
have not taken advantage of the low-cost criminal market is because
criminal arbitration is legally unenforceable and cannot preclude a crimi-
nal prosecution,118 and not because of any technical difficulties in han-
dling criminal cases.  After all, if private arbitration boards can resolve
113 There is no need to fear privately imposed standards of law, as does Namazie, supra
note 101.  Namazie decries what she considers to be the lack of procedural safeguards in
Sharia law.  But as long as the parties voluntarily pick a particular venue, free from external
coercion, then they have made their preferences as to procedural law known.  In fact, because
the criminal system presently allows no competition among criminal courts, we have no way
of knowing that the present system is, from the victims’ and defendants’ perspectives, prefera-
ble to any other arrangement that might arise in a free market.
114 Cf. Barnett, Restitution, supra note 22, at 291–92 (discussing assignments to third-
party insurers).
115 See supra notes 58–60 and accompanying text.
116 See David Friedman, Private Creation and Enforcement of Law: A Historical Case, 8
J. LEGAL STUD. 399, 406 (1979).
117 See Joseph R. Peden, Property Rights in Celtic Irish Law, 1 J. LIBERTARIAN STUD. 81,
87 (1977).
118 See, e.g., Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 239–40
(1987) (assuming that a purely criminal case is nonarbitrable).  For an emblematic example of
the common law rule against criminal arbitration, see 19 STANDARD PENN. PRAC. § 103:297
(2d ed. 1981) (“[A]ny dispute or controversy . . . [except those] involving questions of a
criminal nature or a criminal defense, may be submitted to arbitration.”).
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complex issues like international commercial class actions,119 then they
are likely to have little trouble resolving the relatively simple issues of
the criminal law.  Except for the most complicated RICO or white-collar
conspiracy cases (which could be handled by the same people who arbi-
trate other noncriminal business disputes),120 criminal arbitration boards
would not need to review extensive amounts of technical documents, fa-
miliarize themselves with the ins and outs of business custom, or develop
a deep understanding of financial markets.  Typically, they would be ar-
bitrating doctrinally simple issues such as assault and battery, where—
shorn of the public-wrong-oriented criminal law’s focus on mental state
and procedure—the primary issues are whether the defendant committed
the crime and, if so, what the victim’s damages are.  Even if the crime is
an emotionally charged one like rape or murder, the technical difficulties
of resolving it pale in comparison to resolving many commercial
litigations.
It might, however, be objected that, unlike business disputes, where
the parties are in theory equally situated, deal dispassionately at arm’s
length, and often agree in the initial contract to use arbitration instead of
civil litigation, criminal disputants will only seek out an arbitration board
after the crime occurred, without benefit of an original contractual agree-
ment, and with their judgments clouded by the emotions that the crime
created.  Moreover, unlike businesspeople—who want to foster good
reputations throughout their industry—criminal disputants will not care
to, or have an incentive to, cooperate with a private body that lacks the
power of the state.
But, in reality, criminal disputants have little incentive to refuse ar-
bitration and to deal with the state’s criminal justice system instead.  The
victim certainly has little to gain, except for the satisfaction of seeing the
criminal imprisoned, while the criminal would realize that, if he or she
refuses to cooperate or make payment, the alternative is the brutality and
stigma of prison.  Both parties would therefore gain from following
through on arbitration and avoiding the criminal justice system, regard-
less of what their temporary emotions, immediately following the crime,
might indicate.
119 See, e.g., KATHRYN HELNE NICKERSON, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (2005), availa-
ble at http://www.osec.doc.gov/ogc/occic/arb-98.html (summarizing arbitration’s popularity
for international business disputes).
120 Note that in Shearson, 482 U.S. at 220, the Supreme Court allowed an arbitration
board to handle RICO and securities fraud claims, which were complex civil claims that also
implicated criminal law. Id. at 239–40 (holding that the “overlap” with criminal law was not
serious enough to prevent arbitration).  The Court held that “potential complexity should not
suffice to ward off arbitration.” Id. at 239 (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 633 (1985)).
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2. Restorative Justice
Today, the “restorative justice” movement is the dominant move-
ment working toward reasserting the victim’s place in criminal law.  Like
restitution, restorative justice seeks to minimize the role of the prison and
emphasizes reparations to the victim over retributive punishment.121  Un-
like restitution, however, restorative justice holds that the primary goal of
the justice system should be, not just compensation, but also repairing
the bonds between the criminal, the victim, and the community that were
severed during the criminal act.122  The role of the law for the restoravist
is to repair property loss, empower both victims and offenders, promote
peace and caring, and come to an emotional resolution of the problems
preceding and following from a crime.123  Restoravists frequently point
to the support for such communitarian ideals in the major world reli-
gions.124  They likewise chide the individualistic premises of the modern
justice system for creating a zero-sum game where, if one party wins, the
other must lose, instead of creating a win-win situation were the parties
can move toward mutual healing and reconciliation.125
Restorative justice is certainly an improvement over the current sys-
tem.  However, from a restitutionary perspective, it is under-inclusive.
For, while parties should certainly be free to seek restitution through re-
storative means, restitution makes no assumptions about which remedy
the parties should in fact choose.  If the parties want to choose the “zero-
sum” method of modern tort law, they would be free to do so under a
restitutionary system.  Without denying that restorative justice can con-
stitute one valid form of compensation, restitution recognizes that some
victims may have no interest in emotional healing, but simply want com-
pensation for their loss.  However, in an opt-out system, we may expect
to see higher rates of restorative justice, perhaps administered by media-
tion boards, in poor, inner-city communities, where—putting aside the
financing options discussed above—the likelihood of receiving full resti-
tution from a poor criminal is relatively low, and where the community
feels a shared interest in promoting and strengthening its own internal
bonds as a means of overcoming its lack of social and economic
power.126  But among communities with little sense of shared interests,
121 See John Braithwaite, Restorative Justice and a Better Future, INT’L INST. FOR RE-
STORATIVE PRACTICES (Oct. 17, 1996), http://www.iirp.edu/article_detail.php?article_id=
NDk4; Colson, supra note 64, at v–vi; Howard Zehr, Restorative Justice? What’s That?, (Oct.
22, 2009), available at http://www.iirp.edu/article_detail.php?article_id=NjMx.
122 See BRAITHWAITE, supra note 20, at 14–15; Colson, supra note 65, at vi.
123 See BRAITHWAITE, supra note 20, at 14–15.
124 See, e.g., id. at 3–5; Colson, supra note 65, at vi.
125 See BRAITHWAITE, supra note 20, at 244–45.
126 See Elijah Anderson, Going Straight: The Story of a Young Inner City Ex-Convict, in
MASS IMPRISONMENT: SOCIAL CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 121 (David Garland ed., 2001) for
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we could expect a more traditional “individualistic,” or “tort-like,” resti-
tutionary system to take hold.
Neither outcome is necessarily better than the other; each just fits
the particular circumstances or needs of different groups.  But the restor-
ative justice movement implicitly denies the wide range of forms that
restitution can take.  It supposes that the “right” model is to promote
emotional healing and togetherness, even though many victims may want
something more retributive, or simply want to be returned to the status
quo ante.  By seeking to confine all criminal disputes into one model,
restorative justice is incomplete.
But despite being incomplete, restorative justice has done much to
bring restitutionary ideals into the mainstream, even gaining the recogni-
tion of the American Bar Association.127  Nevertheless, most experi-
ments in restorative justice have, unfortunately, taken place under the
direction of criminal courts and state justice departments,128 or as merely
a method of rehabilitating already-convicted prisoners.129  As such, they
operate within the dominant public-wrong conception of the criminal
law.  This stands in sharp contrast to the restitutionary and opt-out sys-
tems envisioned in this Note, which represent a complete rejection of the
philosophy underlying the current criminal justice system.130
Restorative justice’s limited scope, however, is not an inherent
shortcoming, but simply reflects the power with which the contemporary
conception of crime grips the legal system.  But it bodes well for restitu-
tion’s future viability that a theory stressing the importance of individu-
als as opposed to the state, and of reparations as opposed to prison time,
has been able to survive and grow.
a story emphasizing the need for a strong sense of community as a means for overcoming the
destructive nature of inner-city life.
127 See Criminal Justice Section: Alternative Dispute Resolution and Restorative Justice
Committee, AM. BAR ASS’N, http://apps.americanbar.org/dch/committee.cfm?comCR100000
(last updated Aug. 21, 2012).
128 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 3796ee(b)(14) (2006) (authorizing federal grant money for state
restorative justice programs); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-2-213 (2011) (creating state “re-
storative justice coordinating council”); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 985.155 (West Supp. 2012) (au-
thorizing creation of state-run “neighborhood restorative justice centers” for first-time,
nonviolent juvenile offenders); MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-15-2013 (2011) (defining the purpose
of the state justice department’s “office of restorative justice”); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 2a
(2008) (stating the state’s policy of integrating restorative justice principles into the criminal
law).
129 See, e.g., Colson, supra note 65, at xi–xii; Daniel W. Van Ness, Restorative Justice in
Prisons, RESTORATIVE JUST. ONLINE (July 2005), http://www.restorativejustice.org/prison/
prison-cell/editions/2005/july05/rjprisons.
130 See, e.g., Barnett, Restitution, supra note 22, at 291–92.  Many advocates of restora-
tive justice, moreover, argue against a fully privatized system, which this Note would allow.
See, e.g., BRAITHWAITE, supra note 20, at 258–60 (arguing that restorative justice requires a
public, collectivist component).
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CONCLUSION
The strength of previous victims’ rights movements strongly corre-
lates with heartening legal changes.  Court-ordered restitution laws131—
and the Supreme Court’s subsequent decision that such obligations can-
not be discharged in bankruptcy132—and laws requiring the victims’ in-
put in prosecution133 provide prominent examples.  Hopefully, laying out
the intellectual foundations for an opt-out provision, as this Note at-
tempts to do, can produce a similar impetus toward, and interest in, a
more restitutionary criminal law.  The opt-out system alone would not
engender pure restitution, because it would keep the criminal courts as a
default option for the parties to fall back on.  Nor would it address “vic-
timless crimes” like drug possession or prostitution, in which there
would be no aggrieved party with standing to opt out of the criminal
courts.  But I believe that any shift toward restitution and away from the
public-wrong conception of criminal law, with its attendant features of
mass incarceration, will constitute a net social benefit.  That is especially
so when, as here, the shift comes about through the voluntary, individual
choices of real victims and defendants.  What form that shift ultimately
takes—and whether people will continue the push from an opt-out crimi-
nal system to pure restitution—is for a free people, informed of the full
spectrum of choices in criminal law, to decide.
131 For a discussion of contemporary restitution laws, see supra note 38.
132 See Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 42–43 (1986).  The Supreme Court still consid-
ered these restitution laws to constitute a form of state-administered punishment, rather than a
private remedy. See id. at 53 (“Because criminal proceedings focus on the state’s interests in
rehabilitation and punishment, rather than the victim’s desire for compensation, we conclude
that such restitution orders imposed in such proceedings operate ‘for the benefit of’ the
State.”).  Therefore, the Court’s holding does not appear to apply to the restitution program
that I have outlined here.  However, even holding that restitution is a valid state interest for
purposes of criminal law helps normalize it and to prepare the ground for future gains for the
benefit of victims.
133 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-23-64 (LexisNexis 2011); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11 § 9405
(2007); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-35-3-5 (LexisNexis 1998); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:1844(D)
(2010); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-11A-6(a)(5) (LexisNexis 2010).
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